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Matters of Memory in Krapp's Last Tape and Not I 
Jeanette R. Malkin 
Krapp's Last Tape (1958) embodies memory and the dislocations of time; 
in Not I (1972) even the "body" disappears—"whole body like gone"—and only 
a dislocated memory, visualized as a "subjectless" mouth, is left us. Theatrically, 
we have here the break between a mimetic theatre (however reduced), and 
postmodern dissolutions. Krapp may be drawn as a metaphor for man as clown 
or bum—white face, purple nose, short pants, large shoes; but for all the pregnant 
minimalism he still retains a distinct character, a discernable story, a room, a 
name. Mouth obviously has none of these; she also has no body or head attached 
to the red orifice we see, no logical placement on stage—floating as she (it) does 
eight feet above stage level—no context or frame, beginning or end to the 
unstoppable monologue we hear her speak. Separated by fourteen years, these 
related plays both attempt to objectify memory within highly visual—and very 
different—organs of remembrance. It is this difference, and the world-views 
signified through this difference, that will interest me here. I will claim that 
Beckett's ever-moving fragment of body, Mouth, recalling a being which slips 
away and disperses even as it is being evoked, reflects an ontologically different 
notion of memory and self than does the static memory-machine (the tape-
recorder) we find in dialogue with Krapp. Inversely, we might say that this 
changed perspective governed Beckett's reformed strategy (in Not I) for imaging 
and theatricalizing memory. 
There was never a lack of "rememberers" in Beckett's theatre: Hamm's 
ongoing story of a remembered life, probably his own (Endgame); Winny's 
struggle to remember bits of her cultural past (Happy Days); the divergent 
testimonies given by the three complicit figures of Play. But in Krapp's Last 
Tape, the past remembered is already problematized through Beckett's experiment 
in physically imaging memory and memory processes on stage. Thus we must 
negotiate between two tenuously connected versions of self—Krapp, the banana 
eating body; and Krapp the memory-box. The externalized ontological dualism 
found in this play is a basic Beckettian motif, here applied specifically to the 
relation between selfhood and recall. With Not I and Beckett's ensuing set of 
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short plays, scattered between 1972 (Not I) and 1980 (Ohio Impromptu), this 
dualism is itself problematized and a completely different view of memory, and 
selfhood, is advanced through a range of dramatic strategies. Beckett grapples 
in these late plays with formalizing devices, with ways of giving theatrical shape 
to the process and posture of remembrance; and to the subsequent problems of 
reception. It is not the memories revealed or the words which suddenly "come" 
that are of the essence. Rather, it is the complex net of memoried states of 
being—the interplay of inner voices, the pluralisms of self-perception, the 
complexity of agency, of volition or its lack, the simultaneity of pasts and present, 
the multiple modes of repetition and recall, of traces and patterns: which evoke 
a sense of our own trivial yet inevitable multiplicity, simultaneity, 
fragmentedness. In a discussion of these late plays, Bernard Beckerman wrote 
that: "As we concentrate to make sense out of the alternating strands of memory, 
we face the question . . . Are we anything other than listeners to our own 
memories?"1 Through a study of the similarities—but especially of the 
differences—between Krapp 's Last Tape and Not I (which in a loose sense can be 
seen to represent some of the common traits of these late plays, especially in 
terms of memory and selfhood), we can perhaps trace a break between a mimetic, 
dualistic theatre—and a theatre of dispersal, plurality, and irreducible 
fragmentation. 
In Krapp, memory is imaged as a large two-spooled (double-lobed) tape-
recorder. This choice of metaphor—a mechanical, material box—presupposes and 
shapes the way we view the memory function, and thus the "self," in Krapp. It 
also entails a set of concepts and dramatic moves—mechanistic, dualistic, 
basically still mimetic—which, I will claim, are no longer relevant in Not L 
Memory in a box means memory localized, thrillingly present within a concrete, 
material form. No longer elusive or diffuse, memory seems self-contained, 
redeemable, depending for its "use" on finding the right reel, twisting the right 
levers, locating the desired section of tape. The comic ironies wrested by Beckett 
from Krapp's difficulty in locating the exact memory he seeks (his need to fast 
forward and rewind), only underscore the dualism of rememberer and memory, 
where memory is imaged as an objectified "other" which cannot be completely 
controlled. Krapp, "a wearish old man," sits in his den trying to record his 
impressions of the past year—as he does every year on his birthday—but is instead 
drawn to listen, again, to a recording from his past, the memory of "farewell to 
love." The past that Krapp seeks is elicited from his box at will; it is also ironized 
and contextualized through Krapp's present behavior: his visual doubling of the 
traits described in memory (eating bananas, drinking, writing notes on an 
envelope), his difference from the self in memory (more lonely still, more 
depleted, and there is also forgetting). This objectification of memory is a brilliant 
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way to theatricalize dual consciousness; it is also a way to give a one-man 
play—"company. " Krapp presents us not only with the act of remembering a life: 
it is also a dialogue between living and remembrance, present and past—Man and 
his Memory. 
Remembering is, in a sense, an inherently dualistic activity. The one part 
of the mind REcalls, brings up the past; while the other watches, listens, is 
reminded, reacts, sometimes refuses the memory brought up and rejects it 
(Mouth: "try something else . . . think of something else"2). Memory, writes St. 
Augustine, 
is like a great field or a spacious palace, a storehouse for 
countless images of all kinds which are conveyed to it by the 
senses . . . When I use my memory, I ask it to produce 
whatever it is that I wish to remember. Some things it 
produces immediately; some are forthcoming only after a delay, 
as though they were being brought out from some inner hiding 
place; others come spilling from the memory, thrusting 
themselves upon us when what we want is something quite 
different [Mouth: "not that either? . . . nothing to do with that 
either?" 22] . . . These I brush aside from the picture which 
memory presents to me, allowing my mind to pick what it 
chooses, until finally that which I wish to see stands out clearly 
and emerges into sight from its hiding place. . . . and as their 
place is taken they return to their place of storage, ready to 
emerge again when I want them.3 
For Augustine, the will ("I") is lord, sending messengers into memory to recover 
neatly stored, sometimes more deeply interred but still redeemable, always 
res tor able remembrances. Although Krapp, like Augustine, can retrieve his 
buried past, it is no longer clear which is master: the will or the memory. The 
easy sway of Augustine's present "I" over stored and malleable memory is no 
longer the working assumption. Krapp will finally forego the attempt to record 
his immediate impressions and allow the voice of the past to speak instead. The 
voice of memory will prove stronger than Krapp's own. 
Memory seeps into most of Beckett's late plays. In his film-script Eh 
Joe, Beckett, in an almost paradigmatic demonstration of the hold of the past over 
the present, has the mocking voice of memory invade Joe's room even after he 
carefully (and literally) locks all entrances and seals all cracks. For Joe, as for 
Krapp, memory is still a "material" other, which can hopefully be excluded 
through lock and key; for Joe, as for Mouth, memory "comes" uncalled in a 
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flood of uncontrollable words. Beckett's rememberers, like Augustine's, are 
often dual beings, split dramatic character—body and mind (memory-box), voice 
and ear, Reader and Listener, the perceiving subject and the perceived object. But 
in Beckett, duality (and, as we shall see, shattered multiplicity) suggest a 
multiplied cast of characters vying and negotiating for a determination of self. 
This chasm within being—the impossibility of perceiving the self without turning 
the self into an object—and thus the impossibility of unity, is a basic trope of 
remembrance. "Because of this disjunction," writes Linda Ben-Zvi, "all of 
Beckett's people have the continual sense that they are being watched, if only by 
themselves."4 In Krapp's Last Tape this duality is turned into a refracting 
dialogue within an externalized self, and thus made dramatically explicit. In Not 
/, duality is both assumed (Mouth/Auditor) and shown as an insufficient, perhaps 
a useless model for the dispersed and centerless contemporary consciousness. 
Augustine in his Confessions, analyzes the function of memory through 
a simple example that aptly parallels the mechanistic images of Krapp's memory-
machine: the recitation of a psalm. When we recite, Augustine writes, the mind 
"performs three functions, those of expectation, attention, and memory. The 
future, which it expects, passes through the present, to which it attends, into the 
past, which it remembers." As the recitation of the psalm gets on the expectation 
grows shorter and the memory grows longer; this is true too, Augustine 
continues, of every part of the psalm, and of life itself.5 Augustine's description 
of the movement of future into past is like the "décantation" of self of which 
Beckett writes in Proust: "The individual is the seat of a constant process of 
décantation, décantation from the vessel containing the fluid of future time, 
sluggish, pale and monochrome, to the vessel containing the fluid of past time, 
agitated and multicoloured by the phenomena of its hours."6 This same 
"movement" is given visual form in Krapp. James Olney has suggested that the 
two spools of Krapp's magnetic tape-recorder, in their iconic movement, offer a 
visual parallel to Augustine's description of time's passage from future into past. 
Krapp "listens to the narrated episodes of his life pass from the spool of 
expectation on the left across the head of the tape player, which corresponds to 
the present narration, to be taken up by the spool of memory on the right - which, 
when rewound, becomes once again the spool of expectation."7 Applying 
Augustine's spacial description of time to Krapp's tapes allows us to easily 
visualize concepts such as "returning" to the past (rewind), or "seeking" a 
different memory. It also underlines the dualistic view of memory as a present 
"I" (the agent) interacting with a dormant but available past stacked up before 
him, as in Augustine's images of a memory "storehouse." 
In Not /, memory is less easily compartmentalized, its movement less 
easily visualized. A disembodied mouth hanging eight feet above stage level is the 
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organ of memory, its externalized form; the "agent" or initiator of recall (such 
as Krapp), is missing—thus we no longer have an obvious "dialogue." Unlike 
Krapp which begins in pantomime, in comic gropings that acquaint us with the 
present Krapp ("characterize" him) before we hear of (and from) the voice of 
Krapp past, Mouth is found from the first in médias res of an already ongoing 
discourse. Mouth is supplied without context or frame; her mawings begin before 
she, or we, begin to listen, they continue after. All we will see is red lips 
endlessly moving, lit by a spot, and downstage left a tall figure, "sex 
undeterminable," standing fully gowned in a long hooded djellaba, facing Mouth, 
almost unmoving, and silent throughout. Mouth's logorrhea is offered without 
preamble or explanation. It is not her birthday, as it is Krapp's, this is not a 
ritual occurrence, a yearly word-letting, as it is in Krapp, there is no external, 
narrative explanation for what we see—aside from what may be gleaned, 
gradually and at our peril, from Mouth's text which suggests a sudden and 
involuntary "coming" of speech to the lips of an old woman at the moment of the 
body's demise. 
Several dualisms and seemingly mechanical repetitions are initially 
apparent in Not I. Mouth and body positioned on stage certainly suggest a 
mind/body dualism, just as they suggest the division between speaker and auditor 
in consciousness, parallel to Krapp and his voice-machine. Iconigraphically, 
Mouth seems to represent absolute speaker; the second figure, Auditor, so named 
and physically positioned towards Mouth, would thus seem to image absolute 
listener. But Auditor does not listen as Krapp listens—choosing the memory 
("allowing my mind to pick what it chooses"), judging whether he's interested, 
returning to a given section. Nor does he (she?) listen as does Listener in Ohio 
Impromptu. S/he may, philosophically, be a Berkeleyan perceiver objectifying 
and maintaining the existence of Mouth, but (unlike Berkeley's God) s/he 
functions as a witness without being an implicit source of what s/he sees; is, 
indeed, an affective mediator only for the audience. Unlike Listener in Ohio, 
who intervenes physically through knocks which affect the spoken text, or Krapp 
who manipulates memory physically through lever and reel, Auditor is totally 
outside the cognizance, or function, of Mouth, and in no way modifies the 
workings of memory itself.8 Auditor comments on Mouth's monologue four 
times: through four small gestures expressing (so Beckett tells us in his text) 
"helpless compassion." These gestures are physically directed towards Mouth, 
but affectively aimed at the audience. Thus Mouth, who would seem to be a 
speaking and not a listening organ, would seem to be the one half of a dualistic 
pair—mouth and ear—is, I will claim, actually both, and much more. 
Mouth, like Krapp's "box," is a self-repeater, returning again and again 
to the same texts as though in a loop ("and now this stream . . . not catching the 
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half of i t . . . not the quarter . . . " repeats, for example, five times in this short 
text). Often the repetitions seem obsessive; but they are never mechanical, never 
mere spoken recordings. Each repetition is also an addition to and variation of 
the previous texts, always a "clothed" repetition—to use Gilles Deleuze's 
distinction between mechanical "naked" repetitions which confirm sameness, and 
"clothed" repetitions which, through variation, uncover difference.9 Not only is 
each repetition of key texts ("tiny little thing . . . out before its time . . . 
godforsaken hole") slightly (at least) reworded, each also leads to an additional 
moment of remembrance. Still, one of the central texts in the play—the text that 
gives the play its name—is indeed repeated five times with little variation, and 
underscored through (almost identical yet depleting) gestures made by the 
otherwise static figure of Auditor. This is the passage which Beckett describes 
as Mouth's "vehement refusal to relinquish third person" and to which Auditor 
reacts with "helpless compassion." Five times Mouth rejects the word "I" 
through the formula: "and she [found herself in the—] . . . what? . . . who? . . . 
no! . . . she! . . . " followed by a pause and (except for the fifth time) a movement 
by Auditor. This precisely repeated section (except for the fifth repetition, when 
the word she! is followed by SHE! . . .) certainly suggests an unheard dialogue, 
indeed, an inner dualism, between voice (who narrates), and some further inner 
voice bringing words—such as the word "I"—which mouth refuses to say: "no!" 
Thus Enoch Brater, for example, concluded that "Mouth is hell-bent on 
obliterating any relationship to a questionable past." Brater develops this mimetic 
image into a figure of duality with the words: "The staging of the play suggests 
. . . a literally dislocated personality: an old woman listening to herself, yet 
unable to accept that what she hears, what she says, refers to her."10 Old woman 
versus inner voice. 
But once we begin attending to Mouth's words (not an easy task in 
performance), we note that the unheard inner voice trying to say "I" and 
vehemently rejected by Mouth, is not the only "dislocated" figure proffered or 
described, not the only intruding piece of self. Nor is "her" only problem—the 
only dualism of a "hell-bent" will—a division between the spoken "she" and the 
proposed "I." Indeed, once we meet the entire inner cast and crew we will have 
gotten to know voice (speaking), mouth (moving on its own), "she" (wherever 
she may be located), the unheard inner voice suggesting "I," a possibly additional 
inner voice intervening periodically in Mouth's narration, brain "raving on its 
own," and the constant buzzing—but we will have completely lost sight of "I." 
Mouth tells us of the voice, presumably the voice we are now hearing, which 
"she" suddenly hears and "did not recognize . . . at first . . . so long since it had 
sounded . . . then finally had to admit . . . could be none other . . . than her own 
. . . " (18). Words "were coming" of their own, voice was speaking of its own 
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volition. The words seem not to be identified with "she" since she—wherever she 
may be located—has a hard time hearing or understanding "this stream . . . not 
catching the half of it . . . not the quarter . . . no idea . . . what she's saying . . . 
imagine!" (18). Nor can she stop mouth, or mouth can't stop itself—"no idea 
what she's saying! . . . and can't stop . . . no stopping it" (19). We next learn 
that "lips . . . cheeks . . . jaws . . . never—. . . what? . . . tongue? . . . yes . . . 
lips . . . cheeks . . . jaws . . . tongue . . . never still a second" are also moving 
on their own, forming words without recourse to "she," wherever she may be 
located. Thus the ear (straining to hear) the lips (moving) the voice (speaking) all 
seem to be working independently, autonomously, neither understood nor 
mediated by "she." 
In a number of sections of the play we find a seemingly dialogical 
relationship between Mouth and an inner (unheard) voice which suggests changes 
to Mouth's monologue. The pattern is constant: each time this occurs Mouth 
listens, repeats the suggestion, and then self-corrects her speech: "she did not 
know . . . what position she was in . . . imagine! [. . .] whether standing . . . or 
sitting . . . but the brain—. . . what? . . . kneeling? . . . yes . . . whether 
standing . . . or sitting . . . or kneeling . . . but the brain—. . . what? . . . lying? 
. . . yes . . . " (15). This inner voice suggesting additional positions to the ones 
Mouth had already named (the same voice, perhaps, that suggests adding 
"tongue" to Mouth's list of "lips . . . cheeks . . . jaws . . . never—. . . what? 
. . . tongue?"), may be the same inner voice trying to say "I," but we have no 
way of knowing. In addition to the speaking voice, the occasionally intervening 
inner voice(s), the self-moving lips and tongue, the "she" straining to hear—there 
is also the brain, "the whole brain begging . . . something begging in the brain 
. . . begging the mouth to stop . . . pause a moment . . . if only for a moment 
. . . and no response . . . as if it hadn't heard" (20). Brain is another important 
player in this drama; for while it begs Mouth to stop, it is also "raving away on 
its own . . . trying to make sense of i t . . . or make it stop . . . or in the past . . . 
dragging up the past . . . flashes from all over" (20). Does brain have a memory 
of its own? aside from the memory of voice which is also "dragging up the past?" 
So it seems; for we now hear of scenes from the past of some life ("walking all 
her days . . ."), which Mouth (paradoxically) claims are occurring in brain, not 
in voice: "the brain . . . flickering away on its own . . . quick grab and on . . . 
nothing there . . . on to the next . . . bad as the voice . . . worse . . . as little 
sense" (20). Like voice, brain too flickers through memories of a fragmented and 
"senseless" past and Mouth, or voice, or "she," is critical. All the while, even 
as voice speaks and brain flickers and "she" strains to hear, there is an inner 
"buzzing"—"dull roar like falls" (20), accompanying all the rest. 
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Paul Lawley writes that "the whole of the monologue, insofar as it is a 
denial—'Not Y—is a lie, a refusal to acknowledge the fragmentary nature of the 
self."11 But WHO, we must ask, is doing the "refusing"? To assume a potential 
"acknowledger" who can "acknowledge the fragmentary nature of the self," is 
to assume the existence of a unifying center of being, an ontological ground 
everywhere denied in this play. Not I invests in every form of fragmentation and 
splintering, imaging through text, figure and performance a consciousness so 
divided against and within itself, so incapable of integration or of being imaged 
as other then a whirl of fragments, that we literally have a portrayal of the being 
of a "Not I." This demonstration of a splintered consciousness torn asunder in 
a multitude of ways, produces far more than a double consciousness or an 
opposition between unified I and fragmented self. Mouth is both cognizant of 
self-fragmentation (and seemingly gives it some united "form" through the 
formless, instantly disappearing medium of voice), and herself captive to a non-
unitary logorrhea which she did not initiate and cannot stop. Moreover, and 
increasingly as the play continues, the words which have "come" are contested 
and denied by, perhaps, additional fragments of self. We find an urge to forget, 
to erase, to censure and thus change parts of the memory being produced: "think 
of something else." Mouth strains under the demands of both an involuntary 
confessional voice, and the voice of resistance, refusing to reveal or denying the 
memories being offered. Each attempt at speech produces a refusal—"what? . . . 
not that? . . . nothing to do with that? . . . nothing she could tell? . . . all right 
. . . nothing she could tell . . . try something else . . . think of something else 
. . . oh long after . . . sudden flash . . . not that either . . . all right . . . 
something else again . . . so on" etc. (22). The attempt to give voice to the 
memory of "how it was . . . how she—. . . what? . . . had been? . . . yes . . . 
something that would tell how it had been . . . how she had lived" (21) is 
continuously disrupted by the difficulties of how it IS to remember, the inner 
fragmentation, the different voices intervening, the strains of recall and, not least, 
the need to forget which constitute the activity of remembrance itself. Not only 
is "she" internally fragmented, she is internally conflicted. This division into 
speaking voice and inner censurer (repression) may suggest a territorialization of 
consciousness similar to the Freudian model; but this spacial image (parallel to 
Krapp's "tapes") dissolves and interpenetrates into further fragments even as we 
try to analyze it. Memory here is not, as Augustine had thought, "a spacious 
palace, a storehouse" in which "everything is preserved separately, according to 
its category" 12~perhaps on (not always well-marked) magnetic tapes. Memory, 
like consciousness, is split and cracked and redoubling, lacking agency or telos, 
with various and contradictory agendas. 
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Inner fragmentation, multiplication, refraction are only a few of the 
play's many strategies for signifying dispersal and centerlessness. Another track 
is through temporal fracturing. At the start of the play, the monologue is heard 
as a sort of "buzzing" for at least 10 seconds before we begin to understand the 
words;13 this repeats for at least 10 seconds at the end, after we cease to 
understand. Clearly, we hear but a fragment of an ongoing monologue which 
repeats both internally and entirely, dispersing mimetic coherence and creating a 
dramatic equivalent for the endless loop. The monologue is possibly being spoken 
out of an immobile, insentient body—"whole body like gone"—after its collapse 
("in the field . . . April morning . . . face in the grass"); yet the words repeatedly 
refer to some future time, after this event. One of the play's most common 
verbal patterns, repeated in nine slight variations, is: "her first thought was . . . 
oh long after . . . sudden flash." An additional four (near) repetitions go to the 
phrases: "when suddenly . . . gradually." How are we to understand this? 
"Long after . . . sudden flash" implies a time long after the occurrence being 
related, but well before the narration we are hearing now: that is, it implies a 
long, ongoing stretch of time. Yet the description of "lips moving" and words 
"coming" seems to imply that the event being described is coextensive with its 
description. The physical image of the disembodied mouth reinforces the sense 
of simultaneity between the incident ("whole body like gone") and the narration. 
Further, the repetition of the words "suddenly . . . gradually," like "long after 
. . . sudden flash," create temporal disorientation through their contradictory 
senses of time, simultaneously given. This sense of splintered temporality is 
recaptured in the structure of the play. Mouth's text seems to be a narrative, 
beginning as it does at birth, telling of collapse, recall, memories. However, the 
feeling of a forward movement is vitiated by the inner repetitions of whole 
sections of text, creating inner cycles ("tiny little thing . . . out before its 
time. . ."), and by the fact that the ending obviously returns us to the start of the 
narrative which had itself started before we began to listen. Beckett so much as 
tells us in the last words of the play that the monologue, which may have fooled 
us into a sense of a forward moving narrative, is in a loop: "hit on it in the end 
. . . then back [. . .] back in the field . . . April morning . . . face in the grass 
. . . nothing but the larks . . . pick it up—" (23, my emphases). This section too 
has been repeated a number of times within the monologue, so that the "return" 
is not signified as a mechanical repetition of the whole, as in Play, but as a 
continued cycle within the cycles of "clothed" repetitions and new revelations of 
the play. 
Thus the monologue moves in a number of directions both "suddenly" 
and "gradually," fusing contradictory senses of temporality. This fluid 
simultaneity of times parallels the "profound paradox of memory"14 which is so 
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central to the writings on memory of the philosopher Henri Bergson. In his book 
Matter and Memory, Bergson differentiates between two types of memory: habit 
memory, and "pure" or spontaneous memory.15 In Mouth we have an 
approximation of Bergson's concept of "pure" memory, unlike Krapp's memory-
machine which is closer to Bergson's description of "habit" memory. Habit 
memory is mechanistic, functional, reflecting a view of time which is serial and 
consecutive: basically a spatial and analytic concept of time, like the image of the 
movement of Krapp's tape. Pure duration—or pure memory—on the other hand, 
is intuitive, multi-directional, simultaneous, spontaneous; Bergson speaks of 
"interpénétration," of flow.16 Mary Warnock rephrases Bergson's theory through 
a concise example: learning a Horace Ode by heart employs "habit memory"; 
recalling the hot summer day when I lay in the field learning the Ode by heart is 
closer to "pure" memory.17 How can we overlook the radical difference, Bergson 
writes, "between that which must be built up by repetition and that which is 
essentially incapable of being repeated?"18 The former, the memorized ode, or the 
passage on "recital" (Augustine) cited above, is locked into a spacial image of 
time, repetition, process. The latter type of memory, key to Bergson's vitalist 
rejection of dualism, is unanchored in temporality; it has neither chronology nor 
image. In Gilles Deleuze's arresting formulation: "The past is 'contemporaneous' 
with the present that it has been. . . . The past would never be constituted if it did 
not coexist with the present whose past it is."19 Mouth, viewed through this 
paradox, exists both in her present disembodied form, throbbing on stage, and is 
equally present in the forms of all the memories which she animates and of which 
she is constituted. In Bergson's spontaneous memory we are free from the 
segmentation and one-directionality of perception which is the prisoner of the 
corporeality of body (of which Mouth is almost freed), and of the tainted 
specificity of language (which Mouth almost overcomes through her fragments of 
speech). Spontaneous memory occurs when the brain's defenses are down, 
outside the control of consciousness. In its purest (ideal) form, we would have 
a "pure intuition of how things are, and were, without the restriction of space, or 
of time." In it we would "know ourselves . . . But, unfortunately, exactly what 
we know can never be adequately expressed."20 If Mouth can be seen as 
something like Bergsonian "pure" memory, then what she perhaps gets to "know" 
but cannot express ("nothing with which to express, nothing from which to 
express"21) is the complete absence of a center of being; that is: essential 
fragmentation. 
Diffusion and simultaneity in Not I extend of course beyond the textual 
to the performative and receptive aspects of the play as well. The textual images 
are, clearly, preceded and anchored in visual fragmentation—the mouth, the 
figure; and their odd positioning, decentered, dislocated, floating above stage at 
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a height both unreasonable and hallucinatory. The fracturing continues through 
the theatrical self-referentiality of Mouth's text which seems to reflect the 
dramatic production we see. Mouth's description of "lips moving [. . .] the 
cheeks . . . the jaws [. . .] the tongue in the mouth" (19) parallels the production 
of sound on stage; her talk of "this ray or beam [. . .] always the same spot" (16) 
mirrors the spotlight in fact aimed at Mouth; the "whole body like gone" reflects 
Mouth's absence of body, as well as Auditor, a body gone from Mouth, or from 
consciousness. Thus the text doubles up as narrative and metanarrative. This 
same doubleness also encourages us to hear the text as reflecting the activity of 
auditing which the spectator experiences. Not only "she" but the spectator too 
hears "the buzzing . . . so-called . . . in the ears"; and faced with the speed and 
fracture of the words, will be "straining to hear . . . to make something of it" 
(19). This is as much a description of the audience's difficulty in auditing and 
perceiving Mouth and text, as of "her" difficulty.22 The "steady stream," the 
words "coming," the "whole body like gone," the "mouth alone" on stage, all 
these, as has been often remarked, reflect metadiscursively on the text we hear, 
mirror reflexively the physical performance we see, parallel the strain of 
reception we feel, and still have referential import for the "stories" being told. 
And all these multiple functions and implications, dramatic and metadramatic, 
need to be held in the viewers' memory, simultaneously. Like "brain" or "she" 
(wherever she may be located), should the spectator want to "make sense" of the 
play, to "piece it together," he or she would likely need to replay the pieces in 
her/his own memory. The performance enacts the multiple dislocations of 
narrative from consciousness; thus, to see the mouth as a person and the voice as 
its life, would be a mimetic act only realized in the imagination of the spectator.23 
Any reading of the play must reconstruct from fragments; and a reconstruction 
for a mimetic reading can only be done through a mis-remembering of the 
disparate fragments themselves. The swirl of competing fragmentations can, on 
the other hand, also free the spectator from representation and allow for an 
intuition of centerlessness and flow. "The great achievement of Not / ," writes 
Keir Elam, "is to free the spectator's imaginaire" so as to allow a "blurring" of 
the competing images and senses of Mouth's body (and being), in the body's very 
absence.24 
This same experience of fragmentation is, in addition, endured by the 
actor of Mouth. Billie Whitelaw, who played Mouth in London under Beckett's 
own direction, was strapped into a chair, head anchored for the spot, body and 
eyes covered to prevent reflection of the light. Whitelaw speaks of being turned 
physically into a Mouth, deprived of her other senses—resulting at first in an 
"out-of-body" experience which is like the extracted mouth we see, inducing 
hysteria and hallucinations. The speed at which the piece needed to be said gave 
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her jaw-pain, and she had difficulty remembering the text.25 Thus the actor too 
experiences fragmentation and memory strain, as does the audience, replicating 
the experience of the fractured "self" on stage. 
Beckett's late "memory plays"—from Not I to Ohio Impromptu—all 
impress a strong, evocative single image onto our memories, images (a displaced 
mouth, a floating head, a steadily pacing ghostly figure, a dressed-up rocking 
woman, two identically dressed men at a table) which are disturbing and not 
easily forgotten. In production, writes Enoch Brater of Mouth, "one is all but 
overwhelmed by the sheer persuasiveness of the image: a mouth staring out at us 
from otherwise 'empty' theater space. Disembodied, suspended in space, and 
throbbing with a constant pulsation of lips, teeth, tongue, and saliva."26 "You 
may find nothing in it," said Jessica Tandy who played Mouth in the 1972 New 
York production, "but I suspect you will never forget it."27 The texts spoken by 
or above these images provide the emotional and intellectual substrata, but are 
less easy to penetrate or recall. "I am not unduly concerned with intelligibility," 
Beckett told Jessica Tandy when she complained that his suggested speed for the 
monologue made the words unintelligible. "I hope the piece may work on the 
nerves of the audience, not its intellect."28 The image, unnerving, functions as 
a memory trigger, evoking the sense and sensations of the piece, the "nerves" 
rather than any plot or narrative line. It is through the image, in this case a 
grotesquely displaced fragment of an absent body, pathetically trying to recreate 
itself through speech, that we intuit the complexity of the drama of absence and 
fragmentedness. And while we may not "get the half of it . . . not the quarter," 
we are not likely to forget the image of mouth/memory recalling a self that slips 
away and dissolves even as its absent parts are being named. 
Beckett's play of fragments invites us, I think, to "think" intuitively, 
through the fragmented images themselves, and through the additional fragments 
produced by text, by voice, by metadiscursive devices, by strategies of reception. 
Billie Whitelaw tells how she cried when she first read the play "not 
understanding one word of it, may I say, intellectually," but intuitively 
recognizing the mode of Mouth's existence.29 The nature of Mouth is perhaps not 
given to rational cognition, to penetration through the will. Every aesthetic 
decision in the play suggests a poetics of dissolution and fragmentation, meant to 
be grasped intuitively in something like Bergson's "pure" memory. Mouth 
creates and erases herself, is constituted and evaporated in ways very like S. E. 
Gontarski's description of Beckett's creative process: "What remains is the trace 
of an author struggling against his text, repenting his originary disclosure, 
effacing himself from the text, and thereby creating himself."30 Compared with 
this, the series of selves in Krapp is relatively easy to grasp. The fractured 
memory of "farewell to love," replayed in three separate fragments, interrupted 
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by additional pieces of Krapp's past, refracted through Krapp's present 
personality and his own attempts at recording, does finally coalesce into a story 
and a history which reflect poignantly on Krapp's present loneliness. Not I 
boggles the imagination in its bottomless, unending production of splinters and 
fractions resistant to mimetic reconstitution and impervious to closure. Thus, 
while Krapp may be thought of as a series of distorted and "distilled" selves, as, 
perhaps, a hall of distorting mirrors in which versions of the self view and reflect 
previous and subsequent versions; Not I is perhaps better thought of as a flow of 
aporias, each opening onto interiority (within Mouth, within the actor, within the 
viewer), each partial image of self displaced or erased or redoubled by a further 
fragment in a mise en abyme of ontological fragmentation and simultaneity. In 
Krapp, the self may indeed already be a series of mobile utterances creating, to 
quote Connor, "a web of mutually enveloping, self-quoting moments, each 
endlessly displaced from its originating context, and regrafted elsewhere,"31 but 
the "regrafted" pieces continue to reflect each other (the laugh, the bananas, even 
the signature loneliness) hinting, even strongly suggesting, some minimal self 
which survives through time—and thus justifying the material metaphor of a 
memory "box." In Not I we really cannot locate a source, a moment, a place at 
which an I, a self, resides. 
Beckett's careful shaping of the fragments of memory in Not / is in many 
ways paradigmatic for postmodern memory-theatre. As can be said of some of 
his subsequent memory-nuggets (That Time, Footfalls, Ohio Impromptu), Not I 
reshapes our notions of theatrical space and time, enacts a multiple dissolution of 
the boundaries of the (mostly absent) self, stresses the process of viewer reception 
over the self-sufficiency of the text, performance over narrative, the parts over 
the whole; it is self-reflexive, open-ended, indeterminate, forever incomplete. 
Thus, that hallucinatory fragment of body, the never-still and thus never 
"formed" Mouth, a perhaps distorted (or "misremembered"32) and virtually 
immaterial version of Krapp's memory-machine, becomes a fittingly flighty 
"emblem" for contemporary ontological dispersal and centerless being. 
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